Victory for a religious hardliner in Iran

Victory for a religious hardliner in Iran

In Iran’s presidential election, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardline religious conservative, has beaten Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatic ex-president who had painted himself as a cautious reformer. Whether Mr Ahmadinejad won by fair means or foul, Iran looks like turning its back on reform—and perhaps on the outside world

Jun 27th 2005

Was it a backlash by Iran’s devoutly Muslim poor against a corrupt elite? Or was it a massive fraud perpetrated on the people by the hardline clerics? Perhaps it was a bit of both. Whatever the case, the margin of victory for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the second round of Iran’s presidential election, on Friday June 24th, was striking. Mr Ahmadinejad, the mayor of the capital, Tehran, and a hardline religious conservative, garnered around 62% of the vote, despite having gone almost unnoticed in the field of seven candidates who had contested the first round of voting, a week earlier.

It was a crushing defeat for Mr Ahmadinejad’s opponent, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a powerful former president (1989-97) and former speaker of the Iranian parliament—who had seemed the favourite from the moment he decided to run. Mr Rafsanjani, a pragmatic conservative who had restyled himself as a cautious reformer, had been expected to face an out-and-out moderniser in the run-off. Thus it had looked possible, whatever the outcome, that Iran’s modest economic and social reforms of recent years would continue if not accelerate, and that its relations with the West—America, especially—might improve. Immediately after the first round, in which Mr Ahmadinejad came second and thus won a place in the run-off, it looked possible that reformists’ votes would transfer to Mr Rafsanjani and guarantee his victory.

So what happened? At the end of the first round, one of the defeated reformists, Mehdi Karrubi, complained that the vote had been fixed. There were indeed some suspicious circumstances: for example, in South Khorasan province, home to many disgruntled Sunni Muslims, the official turnout was an improbable 95%; yet Mr Ahmadinejad, the candidate most associated with the assertive Shia Islamism of Iran’s clerical regime, won more than a third of the votes there. And while Friday’s second-round vote was still going on, Mr Rafsanjani’s aides were complaining of “massive irregularities”, accusing the Basij religious militia—in which Mr Ahmadinejad used to be an instructor—of intimidating voters to support their man.

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However, whatever the extent of any vote-rigging, it seems unlikely that it was the only reason why Mr Rafsanjani did so badly. Conservative-minded Iranians, especially the devoutly Muslim poor, seem to have warmed to the austere Mr Ahmadinejad because of his modest lifestyle, his personal honesty and his reassuringly insular vision.

Mr Ahmadinejad presented himself as a committed follower of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and of the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; and he pledged to put the interests of the poor at the top of his priorities, including fighting corruption. In this he seems successfully to have tapped popular resentment at the country’s elite, widely held to be enriching itself corruptly. The wheeler-dealing and allegedly highly wealthy Mr Rafsanjani is seen as the very embodiment of that elite. Whereas Mr Rafsanjani argued for improved relations with America and increased foreign investment in Iran, Mr Ahmadinejad insisted there was no need for any rapprochement with the “Great Satan”, as official Iranian demonology labels the superpower. On Sunday, America's defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, responded by dismissing the Iranian vote as a “mock election” and calling Mr Ahmadinejad “no friend of democracy”.

Mr Rafsanjani and other reform-minded candidates courted—unsuccessfully, it would seem—Iran’s sizeable youth vote, by promising to continue the limited social liberalisation seen under the outgoing president, Muhammad Khatami. Young Iranians have begun to enjoy greater freedom in such things as how they dress and how they mix with the opposite sex. This now looks likely to go into reverse under Mr Ahmadinejad.

Now, with a religious hardliner in the presidency, the conservatives’ grip on all levels of power seems unshakeable

Mr Khatami’s attempts at advancing liberalisation were constantly overruled by Ayatollah Khamenei and the Council of Guardians, a hardline group of clerics and Islamic jurists. In the last parliamentary elections, in early 2004, these unelected theocrats barred many reformists from standing, with the result that conservatives regained control of the parliament. Now, with a religious hardliner in the presidency, the conservatives’ grip on all levels of power seems unshakeable.

Thus the prospects look bleak for any sort of breakthrough in the issue that most interests the outside world—Iran’s apparent attempts to learn the techniques for making nuclear bombs, under the cover of a civilian nuclear-power programme. Given the sensitivity of the issue, during the election campaign not even the most reformist candidates dared to call for Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions and co-operate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Mr Ahmadinejad is least likely of all to press the clergy and its allies in the military to do so. In his first news conference, on Sunday, the president-elect insisted that Iran needed nuclear technology to generate electricity, though he said that talks with Germany, Britain and France would continue.

The North Korean option

Though poor and jobless Iranians have been drawn to Mr Ahmadinejad by his pledges to combat poverty, he seems the last person to bring about the opening-up of Iran’s sickly, state-controlled economy that is needed. Unemployment is officially at 11%, though the true figure may be almost twice as high. Inflation is 14%, with the prices of some basic necessities soaring. For an idea of where statist Iran has gone wrong, just look at liberalising Turkey, its big rival to the north-west, which has greatly overtaken Iran in national income per head since the Islamic Revolution. Freeing Iranians’ entrepreneurial spirit and making it easier for foreign firms to invest in the country’s colossal oil reserves would do more to improve the lot of its citizens than building nuclear bombs.

Though the election outcome would suggest that voters are not so concerned about winning greater personal freedoms, some Iranians, especially exiles, will remain convinced that beneath the surface there is an unstoppable popular desire for liberty—and they dream of a Ukrainian-style revolution to free their country from the mullahs’ grip. In recent years there have been sporadic protest movements, led by student groups, but these have been swiftly and ruthlessly put down. If evidence of widespread voting fraud in the presidential elections were now to emerge, then such protests might revive. But they would face determined and powerful opposition. More pessimistic Iranians fear a drift towards becoming the next North Korea—a regime that brandishes nuclear weapons at the outside world while its people slide into penury. The chances of this seem to have grown with Mr Ahmadinejad’s victory and the clerics’ reassertion of complete control over all levels of power.

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The British General Election of 2005

The British General Election of 2005
by Donley T. Studlar
West Virginia University
Morgantown, West Virginia

A Historic Result
At the end of a one-month-long campaign, the Labour party achieved its third consecutive electoral victory on May 5, 2005, winning 356 seats out of 646 in the House of Commons, 55 percent of the total. The runner-up Conservatives won 197 seats, 31 percent; the Liberal Democrats 62 seats (their largest amount since the 1920s), 10 percent; and other parties, primarily in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, 30 seats, or 5 percent. Three independents, including anti-Iraq War candidate and former Labour member of Parliament George Galloway, won seats, the most since World War II.

Nevertheless, this was hardly a resounding victory. As Table 1 indicates, the shares of the vote did not correspond to the seat shares. Labour won only 35 percent of the votes cast, or only 22 percent of the total eligible electorate of the United Kingdom. This was a record low for a victorious party in a British election. Turnout was 61 percent, a slight increase on the modern record low at the last general election in 2001. "No excuse" postal voting was allowed for the first time. The Conservatives won 33 percent of the vote and actually outpolled Labour in England, where approximately 80 percent of the British population lives, by 36 percent to 35 percent, although they lost in seats there, 54 percent to 37 percent, with the Liberal Democrats gaining 23 percent of the vote in England but only 9 percent of the seats. Throughout the United Kingdom, the Liberal Democrats won 22 percent, and other parties received 10 percent.

For the ninth consecutive general election since 1974, the United Kingdom showed itself to have a multiparty electorate, even though it continues to have a largely two-party House of Commons. This is due not to gerrymandering but rather to the territorial distribution of party votes, the loss of population in many inner-city constituencies where Labour does well, and the fact that only one member is elected through plurality voting for each district. Constituency boundary revisions are not due until 2007. This result has reignited demands for a change in the single-member-district, simple-plurality electoral system to one reflecting more proportional results. But with the usual single-party majority in the legislature and government, any immediate change is unlikely.

Campaign Styles and Issues
The election campaign was a relatively dull affair until the closing days. The three major parties were not widely separated in ideology or positions on most issues. The major issues were the economy, social policy, and trust in leaders. Labour touted its record of good economic growth along with better health and educational services. The Conservatives complained about Prime Minister Tony Blair's untrustworthiness, especially over Iraq (although they supported the war on principle), and promised to improve health, education, and policing while exercising tighter control on immigration. The Liberal Democrats claimed to be the only alternative to two parties who were both to the right of center. They stood out for their positions against the Iraq War and student tuition fees.

Unlike the United States, there was not extensive debate on issues of moral values. Conservative leader Michael Howard suggested tightening the law on abortion early in the campaign, but then the parties agreed not to discuss it further. Such issues are subject to "free votes," not under party discipline, in the House of Commons.

Despite the presence of some small anti-European Union parties, one important issue that surprisingly did not feature much in the campaign was Britain's relationship to the European Union. Tony Blair's pledge to hold a referendum in 2006 on approval of the proposed EU constitution apparently took the immediate controversy out of this issue. Britain took over the rotating presidency of the European Union for six months in July 2005, gaining the opportunity to set the agenda of discussion.

Trust in the Government
During the latter part of the campaign, the issue of trust in the government focused on the shifting prewar advice that the attorney general had given the prime minister on the legality of the Iraq War. This raised an issue on which Tony Blair has been beleaguered, both within and outside his party, for three years, since a majority of the British public did not favor going to war.

Nevertheless, Labour survived this controversy electorally, although its vote and seats dropped from 2001 (see Table 1). Conservative leader Michael Howard, although able to unite his party better than recent leaders, was unable to overcome the image that the Conservatives would govern little differently from Labour other than that they were less caring about social welfare. After the election, Howard announced that he would step down as Conservative leader as soon as a replacement was chosen. This will be the fifth Conservative party leader since 1997, while Labour has had only one.

But Tony Blair already had pledged that this campaign would be his last as leader of the party. No sooner had the campaign ended than speculation began about how long he would remain. The heir apparent is his longtime chancellor of the exchequer (treasury secretary) Gordon Brown, whom many Labour activists consider to be more left wing than Blair.

With only marginal differences on issues, the campaign focused more on personalities, especially those of the party leaders, than ever before. Furthermore, campaign appeals were influenced by foreign political consultants, from the Australian Liberals (a right-wing party) in the case of the Conservatives and from the U.S. Democrats in the case of Labour. Thanks to Labour support for the Iraq policy of the U.S. administration of George W. Bush, U.S. Republican consultants stayed away from their previous natural allies, the Conservatives.

Regional Variations in Party Results
In Scotland, the number of seats was reduced by 13 to correct for previous central-level overrepresentation, since most domestic issues now are under the authority of the devolved Scottish parliament. Although Labour won 41 of the 59 seats in Scotland on 40 percent of the vote, there is four-party politics in that part of the United Kingdom. Each major party won seats; the Liberal Democrats finished second, with 23 percent of the vote and 11 seats. The party championing Scottish independence, the Scottish National Party (SNP), won six seats. The situation was similar in Wales. Labour won 29 of the 40 seats on 43 percent of the votes. The nationalist party, Plaid Cymru, won three.

In Northern Ireland, the party system is very different from the rest of the country. The two parties representing the less-compromising elements in each community, the Democratic Unionists (DUP) for the Protestants and Sinn Féin for the Catholics, won seats at the expense of the more moderate Protestant party, the Ulster Unionists (UUP). UUP leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner David Trimble lost his seat and resigned as party leader.

Despite Labour losing 47 seats, the number of women members of Parliament (MPs) rose slightly, mainly through internal Labour party efforts. Women now constitute 19.8 percent of MPs, up from 17.9 percent. Of the 128 women, 98 are Labour, an increase of three from 2001. Fifteen ethnic minority MPs of black or Asian descent were elected, 13 for Labour, despite Labour's loss of support among Muslims in several seats because of the Iraq War.

As noted, the results were very regional. Labour lost seats to the Liberal Democrats in the north of England and Scotland, while the Conservatives were their major competitors in the southeast around London. Among socioeconomic groups, Labour support held up better among women, the middle-aged, the middle class, and homeowners. Older voters were disproportionately Conservative, while the Liberal Democrats did especially well among women and younger voters. The major issues on people's minds were health care, education, crime, and pensions. While its support eroded in almost every social category, Labour's inroads into the middle class over the past three general elections, plus its remaining base in the working class, make it difficult to beat.

The cabinet Tony Blair appointed from MPs and members of the House of Lords contained many familiar faces, often in the same positions as in the previous Labour government. In opening Parliament the week after the election, the Queen's Speech set forth the new Labour government's agenda for the next year, including 44 bills. This included measures to introduce identity cards, reform disability benefits, restrict immigration and asylum claims, boost school standards, improve hygiene in public hospitals, tighten policing against antisocial behavior in cities, introduce a law against religious hatred, extend maternity leave benefits, restrict smoking indoors, strengthen antiterrorism legislation, and complete reform of the House of Lords. Once a royal commission reports, there will be a draft bill on pension reform. In foreign affairs, the government pledged to take a lead in securing more aid for Africa and in moderating climate change.

In summary, Labour won its third consecutive election for the first time ever, but with a reduced majority in Parliament and an even greater loss of votes. It showed not so much widespread popular support for the government as lack of confidence in the major alternative, the Conservatives, and an increasingly fragmented and apathetic electorate. Once Tony Blair departs as prime minister, the major question will be whether British electoral politics stabilizes under continued dominance of the Labour party or becomes more volatile.

Table 1:Party Votes and Seats in Last Two General Elections, United Kingdom
                                         2001                                 2005
                          % of Votes  % of Seats         % of Vote  % of Seats
Labour                       41           63                         35              55
Conservative              32           25                         32              31
Liberal Democrats     18             8                          22              10
Other                          9              5                          10                5
                                       2001                                  2005
Voter turnout                    59%                                   61%

Reading: Comparative Politics made simple

Courtesy of College board:

Comparative Politics Made Simple
by Jean-Germain Gros
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri

Making Comparisons Explicit
Most people are subliminal comparativists; others make comparisons their vocation. If you made a decision this morning concerning what to eat, what to wear, and how you should get to work or school, chances are you did so by considering alternatives and choosing the one, for whatever reason, that "made sense." (Milk and cereal or eggs and toast? Jeans and T-shirt or suit? Scenic country road or freeway?) You engage in this listing of and picking among alternatives every day, sometimes consciously but more often than not, I suspect, less so. Some decisions you make quickly; others you insist on taking your time, usually to think through the consequences of each option, before choosing the one that is "best" (that is, the one that is likely to meet your goal with the least possible averse consequences and costs).

Decision making is usually the end point of comparison making. In other words, to decide is to compare, and most of us decide (and therefore compare) all the time.

Comparative politics is about classifying, comparing, and sometimes even choosing, except that the "things" that are of interest to comparative politics specialists are the really big ones: states, societies, ideologies, political systems, countries, regions, time periods, worlds, and so on. At its most basic, then, comparative politics is a method of study (by comparison) and a field of study (of macro social and political phenomena). Comparativists are interested in these phenomena not their own sake (that's the job of area studies specialists, who tend to stress the uniqueness, and therefore non-comparability, of their subject matter) but rather for the purpose of drawing attention to similarities and differences -- especially the latter, of understanding why things are the way they are in one locale but not another -- and of comparing and evaluating realities (for example, public policies).

Looking at Specific Country Examples
To take but one example among many: A comparativist observes that the United States' health-care system is funded mainly by private sources, while the United Kingdom's system is funded by government (through an organization called the National Health Service, or NHS). She further notices that in the UK health care is guaranteed to all, while in the United States more than 40 million citizens do without. But she also notes that those Americans with health insurance have an easier time receiving certain medical procedures (kidney dialysis and transplants, triple-bypass heart surgeries) than their counterparts across the Atlantic. All of the aforementioned differences between the U.S. and UK health-care systems are, in and of themselves, interesting, but you probably want to know more, such as why the two countries' health-care systems are different, and which one is "better."

Our comparativist is like you. Her inquiring mind wants to know, so she investigates. In her probe, she is not likely to confine herself to health care in the United States and the UK (her dependent variable, if I may be technical); she will focus on other issues that she thinks might have "caused" health-care systems between the two countries to be so different. These factors (independent variables) would likely include U.S. and UK history, geography, demography, economy, political institutions, interest groups, and citizen attitude toward government and the private sector.

She spends hours reading about many possible factors: the insular history of the United States and the empire-making history of the UK (which favored the formation of a healthy army and civil servants who could be dispatched around the world); the virtual absence of socialist ideology in the mainstream of American politics and the existence of Fabian socialist ideology in the UK; the division of policy making between separate, if not to say competing, branches of government in the United States and the fusion of executive and parliamentary powers in the UK (which makes for less contention in policy making and implementation); and, above all, her own survey, which indicates that Britons "trust" government more than Americans. Our comparativist may now feel that she "knows" why Americans and Britons have different health-care systems. She may conclude that, although the health-care system differences that exist between the United States and the UK have many "causes," one seems to be stronger than all the others: Britons trust government more than Americans. (In some studies comparativists are able to measure, together and separately, the effects of each independent variable, or cause, on the dependent variable, the effect. Even when they cannot do this, they can make plausible arguments about causes and effects.)

What has our comparativist done thus far, and how? First, she observes a "problem" or "case." Second, she investigates its cause(s). In the process, she reads extensively about not only the health-care systems in the two countries but also their history, political systems, and so forth. The knowledge gained is supplied by secondary sources (for example, books, journal articles, newspapers, and the Internet). To find out about public attitude toward government and the private sector, the comparativist decides to do a survey. Information supplied by this survey may be said to have come from primary sources. The comparativist therefore uses two types of sources to gather facts, or, if I may, information. From these facts, which she has analyzed meticulously, the comparativist makes a case as to why health-care systems in the United States and the UK are different. But she may go even further than that, based on what she has learned from her study. She may conclude that, given the evidence, one country has a "better" health-care system than the other. Here, however, she would be expressing a preference; her research would thus have a normative (or value-based) dimension, not just a positive (value-neutral or empirical) one. Furthermore, she may develop a theory, which is a general statement intended to explain or account for a given phenomenon, about health-care systems that goes this way: Citizen trust in government is the reason why countries have government-funded health-care systems.

National and Global Contexts
The words above in bold are at the heart of comparative politics. The United States and the UK are countries, or, in comparative politics language, nation-states. A nation-state is a large group of people who share (a) the characteristics of history, language, religion, ethnicity, race, political and economic values, and so forth, (b) occupy the same (usually contiguous) territory, and (c) have a government that they recognize as "theirs" and that makes laws and regulations and is expected to defend them in case of an attack by another government. Few countries neatly fit this definition. The United States, for example, has many ethnic groups and religions. Perhaps a better concept than nation-state is a national state, by which a large group of people living under one authority (or state) have come together to forge a common, or national, identity, regardless of other things that may separate them. Nation-states are usually the units of analysis in comparative research, but comparativists can focus on almost anything. A unit of analysis is the main object or actor in an argument, hypothesis, or theoretical framework. It is to be distinguished from the levels of analysis, which are the primary analytical focus of the researcher, which in our example would be American and British health-care systems or policies.

Nevertheless, comparativists almost never ignore certain macro social factors, even when they are not their primary focus of study. These would include the economy, which is whatever arrangement people make to produce and trade the goods and services that they think they need to survive, or otherwise make money; the state, which is the centralized authority that rules over a territory thanks to its monopolistic ownership of force (armies, police, militias, and so forth); political institutions, which are the means by which state power is organized; ideology, which is a worldview by which people make sense of reality and, at the same time, serves as a guide for them to do what is "right"; culture, which is the purported collective experience, characteristics, and orientation of a large group of people (if you think that ideology and culture are closely related, you're right, but they are not the same; ideology is a cognitive road map usually produced by elites [intellectuals no less], and culture is how people actually live); civil society, which refers to non-state organizations that people voluntarily join, usually to defend their interests against the state or express themselves peacefully and nonpolitically (think of political parties, labor unions, your church, and Boy and Girl Scouts); and, finally, the international environment, which refers to actors external to the typical units of analysis (nation-states) of comparativists.

The international environment is composed of other nation-states or countries, multinational, government-sanctioned institutions, which are institutions created by many nation-states to address matters of common concern, for example, the United Nations; multinational, privately owned corporations, which are profit-seeking business organizations that operate in more than one country, for example, Wal-Mart; and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), which are non-profit-seeking organizations that operate on a charity basis and deliver services to the poor and needy across countries, for example, Doctors Without Borders. INGOS also serve as advocates, when they do not provide services (for example, Amnesty International).

You can pick almost any book on comparative politics and you will find at least a mention of the concepts defined above. Sometimes one is the focus of comparison in a two-country study, as when comparativists study political parties in the United States and Italy; sometimes they are bundled with others in a multicountry study, as when comparativists study democracy and economic development all over the world. The relative weight of specific concepts as explanatory variables in the analysis of comparativists largely determines the "school" to which they may be said to belong.

Schools of Analysis
Three of the most prominent schools in comparative politics in the past 50 years have been political economy, modernization theory, and dependency theory. They are chosen here only to give you an idea of the sharply different perspectives that exist in comparative politics. The political economy approach emphasizes, as its name suggests, the nexus between economy and politics. A classic case is Robert Bates' States and Markets in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policy (University of California Press, 1981), in which the author examines how state economic policy in Africa, especially in agriculture, undermines development, and why policy continues in light of failure. Political economy, in turn, is composed of sub-schools, among them rational choice theory, which attempts to use (neoclassical) economic reasoning to explain collective decisions.

Like political economy, modernization theory focuses on domestic forces, but its concern is more about how certain cultural aspects that retard development may be overcome. Modernization theory generally divides society between a "modern" sector and a "backward" sector. The challenge of development is how to overcome the latter. In addition, modernization theory tends to emphasize culture rather than the political economy, which it sees as a dependent variable to be acted upon. Still, the units of analysis in both schools are nation-states, and their levels of analysis, although different, are internal to the units.1

The same cannot be said of dependency theory, for which the global system, not nation-states, is the focus of analysis. In dependency theory, poverty is due to neither so-called backward culture nor deleterious state actions in the political economy but rather the global system itself, in which a relatively small number of "core" countries specialize in high-value-added manufactured goods, while a large number of "peripheral" countries specialize in primary commodity production. Thus poverty in dependency theory stems from the position countries occupy in the international division of labor or system.

To conclude, comparative politics is about serious issues: war and peace, democracy and authoritarianism, market-based and state-based economies, prosperity and poverty, health-care coverage for all and health-care coverage for some, and so on. However, its raison d'être is quite simple: the world is diverse, not monolithic. Furthermore, the world is getting smaller, literally and figuratively. Given the tremendous diversity that exists on our planet, and the fact that no one country is "better" than all the others on every count, there is always room for learning. Furthermore, knowledge is a sine qua non (precondition) for success in an interdependent -- that is, less isolated, more interconnected, and therefore "smaller" -- world. How can we relate to the Chinese if we know nothing about China, its institutions, culture, and history? The job of the comparativist researcher is to make comparisons less subliminal and random and more deliberate and systematic, especially in the things that are critical to human life.


Notes
1. I am simplifying somewhat here. Allowance should be made for international political economy, which emphasizes the role of external forces in the politics of countries. Also, modernization theory stresses the demonstration effect that "modern" countries have on their non-modern cousins.